Month: October 2016

PAB #4 (Methods & Methodology)

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Sipiora, Phillip. “Ethical Argumentation in Darwin’s Origin of the Species.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 265-292.

Sipiora, using a discourse analysis methodology, rhetorically analyses Darwin’s foundational darwintext, On the Origin of Species. Sipiora claims that this scientific discourse breaks traditions in moving away from the conventions of scientific demonstrations as Darwin writes an ethical argument or a “quasi-scientific treatise” (266). The expositor-narrator (speaker) is constantly aware of and seeking to built a relationship of trust with the reader (audience). He does so using three of Aristotle’s subappeals: virtue (arete), goodwill (eunoia), and good sense (phronesis) (266).

ethos

Virtue (arete) is found in Darwin’s passive constructions, establishment of professional integrity, patterns of self-effacement, third-person references, stative verbs, and catenative constructions. In utilizing these rhetorical devices, Darwin rests his dependence “on his attempts to involve the reader in the progressive development of the argument” (276). His “self-deprecating, self-correcting stance is a persuasive ethical strategy,” which Sipiora argues is key to his ethical argumentation (275).

Darwin’s use of goodwill (eunoia) is key in the “conjoining of rhetor and audience in a common endeavor” (276). This is accomplished through rhetorical devices such as identification rhetorical pronoun usage (we, our), rhetorical questioning, value appeals, first-person references (to highlight collective ignorance), and conditional clauses (if). Sipiora calls Darwin’s use of goodwill a “double-edged strategy…[and] a powerful rhetorical weapon…[for] simultaneous bonding with and manipulating of the reader” (279, 280).

Lastly, Darwin highlights good sense (phronesis) in his emphasis on probability. Comment clauses, integration of both first and third person pronouns (I, we), and strategic location of his argument within “accepted scientific investigation” all work together to “appeal to common sense” (282).  Readers “are forced to rely on the good judgment of the expositor” because of our general lack of scientific knowledge and our ignorance exploited through these subappeals (287).

First Edition showing theological quotes by William Whewell & Francis Bacon

While Sipiora is not claiming that Darwin ignores pathos and logos, he is claiming that ethos was more important to Darwin in the writing of this text as “it is crucial that the scientific rhetor create a persona that emanates credibility” because of the time in which the book was published in 1859 (269). In fact, Darwin was so sure that the Church of the time would see the text as heretical, the first edition opened with two theological quotes to start establishing his credibility with his audience immediately. Sipiora ends by addressing the “so what” question: “Perhaps exploring the rhetoric of ethics in scientific texts will lead us to ask generative questions about ethical dimensions and implications far beyond the texts themselves” (288).

Sipiora’s multidisciplinary argument is unique in that it is analyzing a scientific text through a rhetorical lens. Typically, scientific discourse falls into the technical writing territory. Sipiora’s claim that Darwin’s text is in fact a rhetorical argument fits within the scope of Carolyn R. Miller’s claim that the positivist legacy of scientific discourse relaying Truth (uppercase implying absolute) isn’t valid. All writing is arguing for an interpretation of the world around us and is therefore arguing for truth (lowercase implying subjective). Considering Sipiora’s argument, Darwin’s text just might be proof of that claim.

I selected this article to demonstrate the rhetorical methodology of discourse analysis and because it deals with identification. In fact, Sipiora directly references Kenneth Burke’s identification: “The expositor-narrator must share some of the reader’s basic assumptions, what Kenneth Burke calls ‘identification,’ and it is this evolving identification with the reader that makes the Origin such a powerful rhetorical argument” (268). Burke’s theories of consubstantiality are of particular interest to me based on my personal course outcomes to explore major theorists and conversations surrounding rhetoric of identity.

Works Cited

Miller, C. R. “A humanistic rationale for technical writing.” College English, vol. 40, no. 6, 1979, pp. 610-617.

PAB #4 (Methods & Methodology)

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Teten, Ryan Lee. “‘We the People’: The ‘Modern’ Rhetorical Popular Address of the Presidents during the Founding Period.” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 4, Dec. 2007, pp. 669-682. Ebscohost, doi: 10.1177/1065912907304495. Accessed 27 Oct. 2016.

Teten, a rhetorical scholar of political communication, uses rhetorical analysis to do historical inquiry within the field of political science to look at “the ‘traditional/modern’” paradigm as it relates to the speech category of the State of the Union address. For the scope souaof this research, he defines rhetorical leadership “as the process of discovering, articulating, and sharing the available means of influence in order to motivate human agents in a particular situation…it is leadership exerted through talk or persuasion” (Dorsey as qtd. on 670). His method is a “line-by-line content analysis through all of the State of the Union Addresses from George Washington to George W. Bush to count elements such as word length, specific word usage, and context” (671). These categories are designed to highlight both audience in address to congress vs. the people and speaker in identification, authority, and directive rhetoric. Teten concludes “that presidential rhetoric may not be easily categorized as simply ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’” (670, 671).

A closer look at each of the above listed categories reveals claims through each set of graphed data. For example, “contemporary presidents use identification rhetoric [we, us, our] in amounts never before seen in the State of the Union Address” (675). Authority rhetoric (I, me, my) is slightly more prevalent on the modern side of the paradigm, but there are traces of it more consistently throughout presidential history. Directive rhetoric (you, your, yours) is prevalent in our founding fathers’ speeches: “the initial presidents spoke with high levels of directive rhetoric to the people and the Congress…[which] mirrors the directive rhetoric of late-twentieth-century State of the Union Addresses” (678, 679).

Because of the method that Teten use, his study holds value in that each of his data sets holds a plethora of questions for further study. His multidisciplinary methodological approach allows for shared data and terms that can bring much to conversations in both Political Science and English Studies. Teten reiterates communication scholar David ffZarefsky’s conclusion that “‘it is worth re-examining earlier presidencies–not only to appreciate them more and see from whence we came–but to realize striking similarities and recurrent patterns of rhetorical innovation’” (qtd. on 680). The methodology of historical inquiry allows rhetorical analysis to highlight both the importance of the language used as well as the historical figures and to integrate multiple disciplines successfully. In light of our current political season, this analysis was interesting. I wonder what an analysis of Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s stump speeches and debates would reveal in using Teten’s same lens of identification, authority, and directive rhetoric. Would they align with our founding fathers in any ways or further the traditional/modern divide?

I had a hard time finding articles for this week’s topic of methods and methodologies. Rhetoric is a discipline that permeates so many others and its methodologies are fairly vast, at least in their application. I was able to find a small passage in one of our course textbooks that listed out historical inquiry, theory building, empirical research, discourse analysis, and postmodern investigation as a starting point for identifying and categorizing the array of research that rhetoricians do and rhetorical methods employed by other disciplines (Lauer 132). Ultimately, I had to use a couple articles that would highlight a methodology indirectly and connect to identification is some way.

Works Cited

Lauer, Janice M. “Rhetoric and Composition.” English Studies: An Introduction to the Discipline(s), edited by Bruce McComiskey, National Council for Teachers of English,  2006, 106-152.

Rhetoric of Identity: Epistemological Alignment

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I suppose the guiding questions for this paper would firstly prompt a confession of my true identityintentions behind my research interests in rhetoric of identity: I am largely still trying to figure out my own identity. I don’t entirely know what I want to be when I grow up and there are many layers within my thirty-one years of life that have played a part in who I am as a scholar and truth-seeker, an educator, a student, a wife, a friend, a daughter, etc. Behind each aspect of my identity lies questions of how that construction came to be.

What rhetorical elements were and are still at play in my own identity formation and what role do I play in the identity constructions, both actively and passively, of my students and those whom I interact with consistently? What role does society play on my identity and the identities of my students?

 

As we have firmly established already this semester, English is a multidisciplinary field. If we can not agree on any other definition, that fact is evident. This fact is precisely what led me to English and has continued to lure me back into the English classroom, both as student and teacher. Rhetoric is of particular interest to me because it seems to be the intersection of so many aspects of each subdiscipline. The texts of study and contexts of consideration of each subfield require attention to unique rhetorical situations, and the resulting identities are fascinating to me. Language, society and culture, power structures, ideologies–all of these converge through rhetoric and impact identity construction in multifarious ways. How are we ultimately defined by the ideologies embedded within each of the above listed aspects? And how are these ideologies translated to us as members of a myriad of communities at any given stage of our lives? It is for all of these reasons that I have narrowed my research energy this semester to rhetoric of identity.

Althusser: Subjectivity and Ideology

In considering my own epistemological alignment, I find myself returning to Kenneth Burke’s term consubstantiality. Burke uses this term to describe someone who is both joined with and separate from another person or group. In our postmodern society, this seems to be how most people prefer to think of themselves in relation to any discourse community; we want to be part of a community but also maintain some level of independence and individuality. I also find myself more readily drawn to discussions of subjectivity, as Louis Althusser uses the term  when describing the identity construct one assumes within an ideological framework. We are capable, to some extent, of role-playing or assuming some level of expected identity portrayal when functioning within an ideological framework, but are we also able to resist the identity constructions being placed upon us?

From my own personal experience as both a student and a teacher within religious school settings, the overlapping ideologies of religion and education demand a certain identity. When applying a Burkean lens to one K-12 school’s vision statement, these two ideologies converge into a specific identity construct that is expected of students: “to become godly warriors.” Rhetoric helps to maintain the constant tension between the two ideologies and enables the subjectivity of each student and faculty member who is consubstantial with the institution.

In looking through sources for this paper, I discovered quite a spectrum in relation to this conversation of rhetoric of identity. From Freud to Burke to Butler, the topic dips into multidisciplinarity quickly. Burke, a follower of Freud in many regards, believed that “the most fundamental human desire is social rather than sexual” as Freud often claimed (124). Another point of divergent thought in Burke and Freud is in Burke’s insistence that “there is no essential identity” (Davis 127). The identifying “I” becomes essentially an actor assuming the mores of a group as a means of identification. The underlying premise here is that there is “an ‘individual’ who is individuated by nature itself”; this estrangement between self and other Burke explains as biological (128). Overcoming this biological estrangement becomes the rhetorical job of identification.

This of course relates to the Hegelian concept of the Other as well as Judith Butler’s inclusion of otherness in queer theory. Karen Kopelson, utilizing Butler’s theories, seems to be on the other end of the spectrum from either Freud or Burke: no intrinsic identity or self. Freud, claiming there is an intrinsic sexual self, forms one end of the spectrum; Burke, believing in an estranged biological self that is influenced socially, plots another point, perhaps near the middle of the spectrum, while Butler and Kopelson are on the other end of this identity spectrum: identity is performative.

This provides quite the array to consider when seeking my own epistemological alignment. Because my learning outcomes are often connected, at least partially, to my own identity as an educator, my Objects of Study are often students themselves and connecting artifacts, such as school handbooks and vision and mission statements. The pedagogical basis of Kopelson’s argument caught my attention for that reason. However, I was left questioning the ethical implications of a queer pedagogical approach that has “the express intention of disrupting students’ identity-based expectations” or that attempts to keep “them [students] ‘off balance’ by deliberately shifting among and between positions of provocative skepticism and fervent belief” (20, 25). As one instructor within Kopelson’s example stated, some students need an essentialist identity for a time of transition into a more unstable mindset. Are teenagers cognitively and emotionally able to deal with this level of instability?  

These residual questions imply that I do not align in all regards with queer theory approaches. I do, however, believe that Burke was onto something with his discussion of identity being largely molded by society and Althusser’s notions of ideological implications in identity construction. Butler also speaks to gender being a social construct, so in that regard I do agree with her theories. I believe that I align somewhere within this Marxist camp in its emphasis of power structures and ideological influence, although I obviously do not subscribe to all Marxist tenets.

Ultimately, I am fascinated in language’s power, no matter the theoretical lens, to impact identity construction in ways of which an individual is not even aware. I hope to find a niche in researching student identity constructs as one of my primary objects of study. Perhaps, through my research process, I will start to understand my own identity…here’s to hoping!

who-am-i

Works Cited

Althusser, Louis. “From Ideology and State Apparatuses.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 1335-1360.

Burke, Kenneth. “From A Rhetoric of Motives.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001, 1324-1340.

Davis, Diane. “Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2, 2008, pp. 123-147, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02773940701779785. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

Kopelson, Karen. “Dis/Integrating the Gay/Queer Binary: ‘Reconstructed Identity Politics’ for a Performative Pedagogy.” College English, vol. 65, no. 1, pp.17-35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3250728. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

 

PAB #3 (Epistemological Alignment)

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Kopelson, Karen. “Dis/Integrating the Gay/Queer Binary: ‘Reconstructed Identity Politics’ for a Performative Pedagogy.” College English, vol. 65, no. 1, pp.17-35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3250728. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

Examples of Identity Spectrums that many Identity-Based Pedagogical Approaches Promote

Kopelson, building upon Butler’s theory of performativity, argues for a deconstruction of identity-based politics. Much as Butler has stated, Kopelson reiterates that the coming-out narrative further perpetuates the binary construct of heterosexuality as the norm and homosexuality as the other. Identity-based pedagogical approaches, no matter how well-intentioned, run the risk of doing the same: creating a binary structure and encouraging that mindset within students. The both/and negotiated approaches of many English Studies Departments and composition classrooms can either centralize homophobic attitudes, perpetuate an atmosphere of fear, or reduce “‘the problem of remedying homophobia’” (20). Queer theory in general confuses, destabilizes, and challenges existing concepts of gender and sexuality. In fact, Kopelson goes so far as to claim the term queer as a verb because of the above mentioned synonymous actions that accompany a truly queer approach that results in a denormalizing of identity categories.

Ultimately, “any aspect of identity, or any intersection of aspects of identity, can be ‘queered’” (25). Kopelson gives an example of an instructor who queers the concept of whiteness and another who queers the identity of being a Jew. However, there is always a risk in association. Another example the author brings up is that of a Catholic, black lesbian. She is most commonly associated with black females and her sexuality and religion identity constructs become invisible because of this association. Perhaps the biggest issue Kopelson raises in conjunction with identity-based politics is the false presence of unity. As outliers, all marginalized people come to be viewed in unison. Ultimately, this eliminates the possibilities for difference.

Queer pedagogy that is performative-focused allows for “multiplicity… [which is] one of the greatest advantages of queer or performative pedagogies over pedagogies of disclosure/coming out” (25). While many who oppose queer pedagogical approaches fear that these will ironically replicate the invisibility of students who are already struggling for recognition, Kopelson sees this dynamic shift to embrace queer “politics where identity is a persistent and provocative question, but never a certainty” as a viable option to avoid both/and approaches or replicas of binary constructs (32). While she admits the possibility for failure, she ends with a admonition to embrace a pedagogy of no sides where there is a chance for success.

I found Kopelson’s multidisciplinary argument fascinating, especially following the identity theories of Burke and Freud who both argue for some ratio of essential identity, whether it’s social or sexual. Kopelson, utilizing Butler’s theories, seems to be on the other end of the spectrum: no intrinsic identity or self. This provides quite the array to consider when seeking my own epistemological alignment. Because my learning outcomes are often connected, at least partially, to my own identity as an educator, the pedagogical basis of Kopelson’s argument was interesting. I was left questioning the ethical implications of a queer pedagogical approach that has “the express intention of disrupting students’ identity-based expectations” or that attempts to keep “them [students] ‘off balance’ by deliberately shifting among and between positions of provocative skepticism and fervent belief” (20, 25). As one instructor within Kopelson’s example stated, some students need an essentialist identity for a time of transition into a more unstable  mindset. This call for dynamic pedagogy gives me reason to pause and consider all my students. Are teenagers cognitively and emotionally able to deal with this level of instability?  Perhaps explicitly queer pedagogical approaches should be reserved for the collegiate classroom.

PAB #3 (Epistemological Alignment)

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Davis, Diane. “Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2, 2008, pp. 123-147, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02773940701779785. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

Davis highlights some distinctions between Burke’s theories of identity, largely centered upon symbolic acts that result in consubstantiality, and Freud’s psychoanalytic connections of the narcissist self and the other. Burke was heavily influenced by Freud, yet does move decisively away from Freudian notions at a couple points. These points of divergence largely center on Burke’s insistence that “Identification is compensatory to division” (123). Furthermore, Burke believes that “the most fundamental human desire is social rather than sexual,” as Freud often claimed (124).

Burke, the father of modern rhetoric, was well-versed in Aristotelian foundations of rhetoric being primarily an act of persuasion. Burke took that foundation and went further, claiming “that any persuasive act is first of all an identifying act” (125). This is where his term consubstantial is introduced, for one is both joined with and separate from another in most instances of identification. It is important to Burke that complete unity is not established as this unity would negate the need for any rhetorical/symbolic act. The ability to resist complete unity comes through human capability for critique and logic and rests in “the productive tension between fusion and division” (126).

Where one can find a point of divergent thought in Burke and Freud is in Burke’s insistence that “there is no essential identity” (127). The identifying “I” becomes essentially an actor assuming the mores of a group as a means of identification. The underlying premise here is that there is “an ‘individual’ who is individuated by nature itself”; this estrangement between self and other Burke explains as biological (128). Overcoming this biological estrangement becomes the rhetorical job of identification.

Davis briefly turns to the neuroscience behind much of these theories; mirror neurons in the brain actually do not make a distinction when I pick up a pencil or when I see someone else pick up a pencil. The same neurons fire. This unravels some of Burke’s presumptions. Another point of Burkean divergence rests upon Freud’s argument that identity constructs, perhaps better qualified as dis-identifications as they are identity constructs formed through disassociations, formed in the oral stage largely stick. Yet, one can see Burke and Freud converging once again in Freud’s second stage, that is largely social in nature, and in their theoretical bases on an ontological self with desires:

“So although Burke challenges psychoanalytical criticism for reducing the desire for social intercourse to a sexual desire, he is very much with the ‘official’ Freud in his refusal to question the ontological priority of desire itself, which, despite it all, presumes a subject who has desires, be they conscious or unconscious” (130).

 

Freud introduced Hypnosis and claimed that suggestion was magically powerful usage of language

Through an explanation of hypnosis and the power of language used throughout the  hypnotic process, Davis highlights the fact that Burke only briefly and without true explanation deals with the “rhetoric of hysteria.” This points to yet another point of divergence, albeit minor, in that Freud champions the “magic” of language’s power through suggestion, the rhetorical process of hypnotizing someone, which becomes a “fundamental problem” for rhetorical theory (142). Burke maintains “an almost absolute faith in the power of reason” in spite of one’s capacity for hysteria or ability to be manipulated through the power of suggestion. Davis concludes that, ultimately, “the[ir] disagreement is in the details” (125).

This article fits the context of our course outcomes in that it highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the field. Burke’s rhetorical theories are largely rooted in the field of psychology with their overt nod to Freud. Throughout Davis’s discussion, she references Heidegger, Lacan, and Butler, pointing to the interconnectivity of not only our field but theories within the field. This article also gives me some context for my own learning goals of re-familiarizing myself with rhetoric of identity and the key players and terms within that conversation.

Paper #2: Major Questions

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Aristotle’s Rhetorical Situation

        While the major questions utilized by rhetoricians of identity have largely branched out into various directions, the common foundation does harken back to the classical concept of the rhetorical situation. The rhetor and the audience are the dominant points of connectivity when it comes to analyzing identity portrayal and perceptions. These two focal points highlight two of the major questions:

  1. What are the rhetor’s intentions and how does he/she want to be perceived?
  2. How much of the rhetor’s identity is determined by the audience? (Depew).

Each of these inquiries yields a series of sub-questions.

        When analyzing a rhetor’s intentions and identity portrayal, Aristotelian questions arise: what rhetorical tools are available to the rhetor and to what extent is he/she using those tools to persuade an audience? What challenges does the rhetor face in establishing the identity construct necessary to successfully persuade an audience (Depew)? For example, a white, young female teacher may have a difficult time in teaching a largely black/minority high school class because these audience members might associate with a certain people group. Take the nonfiction story of Freedom Writers. Erin Gruwell, the highlighted teacher, struggles to gain the trust of her “audience,” in this case a classroom full of students, because she does not look like them and is in an authority position of which they have come to be leery. Her rhetorical tools revolve around reaching into her students’ culture and pulling out artifacts to which they can relate and from which they can learn through familiar out-of-school literacies. freedomwritersstillcap2

        Sub-questions surrounding the analysis of the audiences’ perceptions of any given rhetor involve an audience’s awareness of social context. Does the audience see the rhetor’s identity as enacted through the social context? Does the audience see the rhetor’s identity as monolithic or fragmented, meaning reliant upon the rhetorical situation at hand (Depew)? This second question can also be inverted and applied back to the rhetor as well.

        These issues stemming from the rhetorical situation also point to questions of terminology. One term used in these conversations is consubstantiality, popularized by Kenneth Burke through his rhetorical theories of identity. Burke uses this term to describe someone who is both joined with and separate from another person or group. Louis Althusser uses subjectivity when describing the identity construct one assumes within an ideological framework. These more recent terms were preceded by Aristotle’s concept of ethos, which has probably changed and evolved the most over the past 2,000+ years. While Aristotle originally used the term as a site of persuasion, scholars and theorists have tailored the definition to modern culture and individual research projects. Susan C. Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds, for example, trace various uses of the term ethos etymologically. They “reread classical ethos through feminist history,” which reveals that while older definitions of ethos point to customs or habits, newer notions point to character (40). Ultimately, their rereading allows for a classical notion of ethos that will acknowledge difference and therefore give voice to feminism (50). Experience and difference become integral to an understanding of the feminist rhetor.

        With a slightly different angle on the term ethos, Marshall W. Alcorn Jr. argues for a definition of “ethos as a relationship existing between the discourse structures of selves and the discourse structures of ‘texts’” (6). Aristotle’s ethos implies that an audience, always passive, can be persuaded by the mere character of the speaker. His primary claim is that the self is ultimately a rhetorical entity as the two act upon one another: “The self is stable enough to resist change and changeable enough to admit to rhetorical manipulation but not so changeable as to constantly respond, chameleonlike, to each and every social force” (17). These changes require effective rhetoric with stylistic devices tailored to an audience well-researched. Alcorn deals with not only the question of terms and definitions, but also with the sub-question relating to rhetor’s identity as reliant upon social and rhetorical context and fragmented rather than monolithic.

        Feminist scholars and queer theorists have also recently taken up the conversation and given the research questions related to rhetorical identity constructs a gender focus. Judith Butler, for example, asks how identity is ultimately established through performative acts. Jacques Lacan questions society’s role in identity construction. Ultimately, while major

Barthes’ “The Death of the Author”

questions connected to identity constructs do still point to the foundational rhetorical situation, there has been a significant postmodern shift away from the rhetor’s intention and intended identity portrayal. Roland Barthes, for example, in “The Death of the Author” puts all the interpretive power in the hands of the audience. These might be the most significant historical shifts in major questions from Aristotle to current theorists: agency now lies with the audience and society.

My personal learning outcomes are always connected in part to how I can apply theory to my own pedagogy to improve practice in my classroom. Jarratt and Reynolds’ reread ethos has pedagogical implications in that it can move student writing past the general audience and “Everyman” voice that students are accustomed to and comfortable with. With a framing of difference and multiplicity, teachers can encourage student writers to “split and resuture textual selves” through their writing (57). To me, this is dangerous territory as student identity constructs are largely unstable to begin with. There are ethical considerations for all theories we expose students to and encourage them to explore. Is it then unethical to potentially shake their identities in such a way? Or do we as instructors have an ethical obligation to expose them to a myriad of identity theories as they are seeking their writing voice? This might be a landscape for rhetorical analysis of identity.

Works Cited

Alcorn, Marshall W. Jr. “Self-Structure as a Rhetorical Device: Modern Ethos and the   Divisiveness of the Self.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 3-35.

Althusser, Louis. “From Ideology and State Apparatuses.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 1335-1360.

Barthes, Roland. “The Death of the Author.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 1322-1326.

Burke, Kenneth. “From A Rhetoric of Motives.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001, 1324-1340.

Butler, Judith. “From Gender Trouble.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 2540-2552.

Depew, Kevin. Personal interview. 5 October 2016.

Jarratt, Susan C., and Nedra Reynolds. “The Splitting Image: Contemporary Feminisms and the Ethics of ethos.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 37-63.

Lacan, Jacques. “From The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 1169-1180.