Category: PAB Entry 3

PAB #3 (Epistemological Alignment)

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Kopelson, Karen. “Dis/Integrating the Gay/Queer Binary: ‘Reconstructed Identity Politics’ for a Performative Pedagogy.” College English, vol. 65, no. 1, pp.17-35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3250728. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

Examples of Identity Spectrums that many Identity-Based Pedagogical Approaches Promote

Kopelson, building upon Butler’s theory of performativity, argues for a deconstruction of identity-based politics. Much as Butler has stated, Kopelson reiterates that the coming-out narrative further perpetuates the binary construct of heterosexuality as the norm and homosexuality as the other. Identity-based pedagogical approaches, no matter how well-intentioned, run the risk of doing the same: creating a binary structure and encouraging that mindset within students. The both/and negotiated approaches of many English Studies Departments and composition classrooms can either centralize homophobic attitudes, perpetuate an atmosphere of fear, or reduce “‘the problem of remedying homophobia’” (20). Queer theory in general confuses, destabilizes, and challenges existing concepts of gender and sexuality. In fact, Kopelson goes so far as to claim the term queer as a verb because of the above mentioned synonymous actions that accompany a truly queer approach that results in a denormalizing of identity categories.

Ultimately, “any aspect of identity, or any intersection of aspects of identity, can be ‘queered’” (25). Kopelson gives an example of an instructor who queers the concept of whiteness and another who queers the identity of being a Jew. However, there is always a risk in association. Another example the author brings up is that of a Catholic, black lesbian. She is most commonly associated with black females and her sexuality and religion identity constructs become invisible because of this association. Perhaps the biggest issue Kopelson raises in conjunction with identity-based politics is the false presence of unity. As outliers, all marginalized people come to be viewed in unison. Ultimately, this eliminates the possibilities for difference.

Queer pedagogy that is performative-focused allows for “multiplicity… [which is] one of the greatest advantages of queer or performative pedagogies over pedagogies of disclosure/coming out” (25). While many who oppose queer pedagogical approaches fear that these will ironically replicate the invisibility of students who are already struggling for recognition, Kopelson sees this dynamic shift to embrace queer “politics where identity is a persistent and provocative question, but never a certainty” as a viable option to avoid both/and approaches or replicas of binary constructs (32). While she admits the possibility for failure, she ends with a admonition to embrace a pedagogy of no sides where there is a chance for success.

I found Kopelson’s multidisciplinary argument fascinating, especially following the identity theories of Burke and Freud who both argue for some ratio of essential identity, whether it’s social or sexual. Kopelson, utilizing Butler’s theories, seems to be on the other end of the spectrum: no intrinsic identity or self. This provides quite the array to consider when seeking my own epistemological alignment. Because my learning outcomes are often connected, at least partially, to my own identity as an educator, the pedagogical basis of Kopelson’s argument was interesting. I was left questioning the ethical implications of a queer pedagogical approach that has “the express intention of disrupting students’ identity-based expectations” or that attempts to keep “them [students] ‘off balance’ by deliberately shifting among and between positions of provocative skepticism and fervent belief” (20, 25). As one instructor within Kopelson’s example stated, some students need an essentialist identity for a time of transition into a more unstable  mindset. This call for dynamic pedagogy gives me reason to pause and consider all my students. Are teenagers cognitively and emotionally able to deal with this level of instability?  Perhaps explicitly queer pedagogical approaches should be reserved for the collegiate classroom.

PAB #3 (Epistemological Alignment)

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Davis, Diane. “Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2, 2008, pp. 123-147, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02773940701779785. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

Davis highlights some distinctions between Burke’s theories of identity, largely centered upon symbolic acts that result in consubstantiality, and Freud’s psychoanalytic connections of the narcissist self and the other. Burke was heavily influenced by Freud, yet does move decisively away from Freudian notions at a couple points. These points of divergence largely center on Burke’s insistence that “Identification is compensatory to division” (123). Furthermore, Burke believes that “the most fundamental human desire is social rather than sexual,” as Freud often claimed (124).

Burke, the father of modern rhetoric, was well-versed in Aristotelian foundations of rhetoric being primarily an act of persuasion. Burke took that foundation and went further, claiming “that any persuasive act is first of all an identifying act” (125). This is where his term consubstantial is introduced, for one is both joined with and separate from another in most instances of identification. It is important to Burke that complete unity is not established as this unity would negate the need for any rhetorical/symbolic act. The ability to resist complete unity comes through human capability for critique and logic and rests in “the productive tension between fusion and division” (126).

Where one can find a point of divergent thought in Burke and Freud is in Burke’s insistence that “there is no essential identity” (127). The identifying “I” becomes essentially an actor assuming the mores of a group as a means of identification. The underlying premise here is that there is “an ‘individual’ who is individuated by nature itself”; this estrangement between self and other Burke explains as biological (128). Overcoming this biological estrangement becomes the rhetorical job of identification.

Davis briefly turns to the neuroscience behind much of these theories; mirror neurons in the brain actually do not make a distinction when I pick up a pencil or when I see someone else pick up a pencil. The same neurons fire. This unravels some of Burke’s presumptions. Another point of Burkean divergence rests upon Freud’s argument that identity constructs, perhaps better qualified as dis-identifications as they are identity constructs formed through disassociations, formed in the oral stage largely stick. Yet, one can see Burke and Freud converging once again in Freud’s second stage, that is largely social in nature, and in their theoretical bases on an ontological self with desires:

“So although Burke challenges psychoanalytical criticism for reducing the desire for social intercourse to a sexual desire, he is very much with the ‘official’ Freud in his refusal to question the ontological priority of desire itself, which, despite it all, presumes a subject who has desires, be they conscious or unconscious” (130).

 

Freud introduced Hypnosis and claimed that suggestion was magically powerful usage of language

Through an explanation of hypnosis and the power of language used throughout the  hypnotic process, Davis highlights the fact that Burke only briefly and without true explanation deals with the “rhetoric of hysteria.” This points to yet another point of divergence, albeit minor, in that Freud champions the “magic” of language’s power through suggestion, the rhetorical process of hypnotizing someone, which becomes a “fundamental problem” for rhetorical theory (142). Burke maintains “an almost absolute faith in the power of reason” in spite of one’s capacity for hysteria or ability to be manipulated through the power of suggestion. Davis concludes that, ultimately, “the[ir] disagreement is in the details” (125).

This article fits the context of our course outcomes in that it highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the field. Burke’s rhetorical theories are largely rooted in the field of psychology with their overt nod to Freud. Throughout Davis’s discussion, she references Heidegger, Lacan, and Butler, pointing to the interconnectivity of not only our field but theories within the field. This article also gives me some context for my own learning goals of re-familiarizing myself with rhetoric of identity and the key players and terms within that conversation.