Paper #4 Theories & Methods: Rhetoric of Identity

Quantitative, qualitative, mixed methods–these are the standard research methods that come to mind when considering scholarly research. For the field of rhetoric, perhaps rhetorical analysis, a staple essay for any secondary writer or freshman composition syllabus. But rhetorical studies contains a myriad of diverse methods that are more specialized to individual research projects.

Before looking at some of these, it is important to note the subtle differences between methods and methodologies. While methods are the practices employed to analyze a text or to gather data, Sullivan and Porter highlight the bias that any researcher brings to a project through a chosen methodology, for it is a “rhetorical invention…[a] rhetorical interaction…it is itself an act of rhetoric” (10, 12, 13). A methodological framework is coupled with an ideology that is largely unavoidable; this is why a researcher must be careful in methodology selection and must be open about the resulting implications of that choice upon the research. Sullivan and Porter go further to claim that methodologies need to be reflexive and flexible in order to fit the given research text or situation (70).

Rhetoric is a sub-discipline that permeates so many others and its methodologies and theories are fairly vast, at least in their application.

Lauer,” in our course text, claims “the field’s methodology as multimodal. Prominent among these modes of inquiry have been historical studies; theory building; empirical research (from qualitative studies like ethnographies to quantitative studies like experiments and meta-analyses); discourse analysis and interpretative studies, feminist and teacher research; and postmodern investigations” (132).

This list serves as a starting point for identifying and categorizing the array of research that rhetoricians do, as well as rhetorical methods employed by other disciplines.

Ryan Lee Teten, a rhetorical scholar of political communication, uses rhetorical analysis to do historical inquiry within the field of political science to look at “the ‘traditional/modern’” paradigm as it relates to the speech category of the State of the Union address. His method is a “line-by-line content analysis through all of the State of the Union Addresses from George Washington to George W. Bush to count elements such as word length, specific word usage, and context” (671). These categories are designed to highlight both audience in address to congress vs. the people and speaker in identification, authority, and directive rhetoric. Teten concludes that “contemporary presidents use identification rhetoric [we, us, our] in amounts never before seen in the State of the Union Address…[and] that presidential rhetoric may not be easily categorized as simply ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’” (675, 670-671).

historical-inquiry

His multidisciplinary methodological approach allows for shared data and terms that can bring much to conversations in both Political Science and English Studies. The methodology of historical inquiry allows the method of rhetorical analysis to highlight both the importance of the language and the historical figures. I do wonder what a similar analysis of Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s stump speeches and debates would reveal in using Teten’s same lens of identification, authority, and directive rhetoric. Would they align with our founding fathers in any ways or further the traditional/modern divide?

Phillip Sipiora uses discourse analysis to rhetorically analyse Darwin’s foundational text, On the Origin of Species. Sipiora claims that this scientific discourse breaks traditidiscourseons in moving away from the conventions of scientific demonstrations as Darwin writes an ethical argument or a “quasi-scientific treatise” (266). The expositor-narrator (speaker) is constantly aware of and seeking to built a relationship of trust with the reader (audience). In hearkening back the historical roots of the field, the author does so using three of Aristotle’s subappeals: virtue (arete), goodwill (eunoia), and good sense (phronesis) (266). While Sipiora is not claiming that Darwin ignores pathos and logos, he is claiming that ethos was more important to Darwin in the writing of this text as “it is crucial that the scientific rhetor create a persona that emanates credibility” because of the time in which the book was published in 1859 (269). Sipiora concludes, “Perhaps exploring the rhetoric of ethics in scientific texts will lead us to ask generative questions about ethical dimensions and implications far beyond the texts themselves” (288).

Sipiora’s argument, with its emphasis on both the rhetor and the audience, rests upon a foundational theory to the field of rhetoric. It also addresses some of the field’s major questions when it comes to analyzing identity portrayal and perceptions, both points of interest in my own course outcomes. The major questions of the rhetor’s intentions and identity as determined by the audience, as well as the challenges facing the rhetor in establishing an identity construct necessary to successfully persuade an audience, are all addressed by Sipiora in the discourse analysis of Darwin’s text (Depew).

Sipiora’s article is of further interest to me because of the author’s direct references to Kenneth Burke’s identification: “The expositor-narrator must share some of the reader’s basic assumptions, what Kenneth Burke calls ‘identification,’ and it is this evolving identification with the reader that makes the Origin such a powerful rhetorical argument” (268). Burke’s theories of consubstantiality are of particular interest to me based on my personal course outcomes to explore major theorists and conversations surrounding rhetoric of identity.

While empirical research, with its ties to scientific writing, has been more authoritative in the past, feminist studies has become more dominant in rhetorical conversations over the past couple of decades. Within this, historical inquiry and discourse analysis have been utilized. For example, our class discussion and course reading on Aspasia involved both methodologies in building from questions of our field’s established history and the gaps in canonized texts. Current trends are building upon the momentum of feminist studies to embrace queer studies not just in the sub-discipline of rhetoric, but throughout the field of English studies. These methodological trends provide theoretical frameworks for much of my objects of study relating to identity constructs.


Works Cited

Depew, Kevin. Personal interview. 5 October 2016.

Lauer, Janice M. “Rhetoric and Composition.” English Studies: An Introduction to the Discipline(s), edited by Bruce McComiskey, National Council for Teachers of English,  2006, 106-152.

Miller, C. R. “A humanistic rationale for technical writing.” College English, vol. 40, no. 6, 1979, pp. 610-617.

Sipiora, Phillip. “Ethical Argumentation in Darwin’s Origin of the Species.Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 265-292.

Sullivan, P. A., & Porter, J. E. Opening spaces: Writing technologies and critical research practices. Ablex, 1997, 1-13, 45-99.

Teten, Ryan Lee. “‘We the People’: The ‘Modern’ Rhetorical Popular Address of the Presidents during the Founding Period.” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 4, Dec. 2007, pp. 669-682. Ebscohost, doi: 10.1177/1065912907304495. Accessed 27 Oct. 2016.

PAB #4 (Methods & Methodology)

Sipiora, Phillip. “Ethical Argumentation in Darwin’s Origin of the Species.Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 265-292.

Sipiora, using a discourse analysis methodology, rhetorically analyses Darwin’s foundational darwintext, On the Origin of Species. Sipiora claims that this scientific discourse breaks traditions in moving away from the conventions of scientific demonstrations as Darwin writes an ethical argument or a “quasi-scientific treatise” (266). The expositor-narrator (speaker) is constantly aware of and seeking to built a relationship of trust with the reader (audience). He does so using three of Aristotle’s subappeals: virtue (arete), goodwill (eunoia), and good sense (phronesis) (266).

ethos

Virtue (arete) is found in Darwin’s passive constructions, establishment of professional integrity, patterns of self-effacement, third-person references, stative verbs, and catenative constructions. In utilizing these rhetorical devices, Darwin rests his dependence “on his attempts to involve the reader in the progressive development of the argument” (276). His “self-deprecating, self-correcting stance is a persuasive ethical strategy,” which Sipiora argues is key to his ethical argumentation (275).

Darwin’s use of goodwill (eunoia) is key in the “conjoining of rhetor and audience in a common endeavor” (276). This is accomplished through rhetorical devices such as identification rhetorical pronoun usage (we, our), rhetorical questioning, value appeals, first-person references (to highlight collective ignorance), and conditional clauses (if). Sipiora calls Darwin’s use of goodwill a “double-edged strategy…[and] a powerful rhetorical weapon…[for] simultaneous bonding with and manipulating of the reader” (279, 280).

Lastly, Darwin highlights good sense (phronesis) in his emphasis on probability. Comment clauses, integration of both first and third person pronouns (I, we), and strategic location of his argument within “accepted scientific investigation” all work together to “appeal to common sense” (282).  Readers “are forced to rely on the good judgment of the expositor” because of our general lack of scientific knowledge and our ignorance exploited through these subappeals (287).

First Edition showing theological quotes by William Whewell & Francis Bacon

While Sipiora is not claiming that Darwin ignores pathos and logos, he is claiming that ethos was more important to Darwin in the writing of this text as “it is crucial that the scientific rhetor create a persona that emanates credibility” because of the time in which the book was published in 1859 (269). In fact, Darwin was so sure that the Church of the time would see the text as heretical, the first edition opened with two theological quotes to start establishing his credibility with his audience immediately. Sipiora ends by addressing the “so what” question: “Perhaps exploring the rhetoric of ethics in scientific texts will lead us to ask generative questions about ethical dimensions and implications far beyond the texts themselves” (288).

Sipiora’s multidisciplinary argument is unique in that it is analyzing a scientific text through a rhetorical lens. Typically, scientific discourse falls into the technical writing territory. Sipiora’s claim that Darwin’s text is in fact a rhetorical argument fits within the scope of Carolyn R. Miller’s claim that the positivist legacy of scientific discourse relaying Truth (uppercase implying absolute) isn’t valid. All writing is arguing for an interpretation of the world around us and is therefore arguing for truth (lowercase implying subjective). Considering Sipiora’s argument, Darwin’s text just might be proof of that claim.

I selected this article to demonstrate the rhetorical methodology of discourse analysis and because it deals with identification. In fact, Sipiora directly references Kenneth Burke’s identification: “The expositor-narrator must share some of the reader’s basic assumptions, what Kenneth Burke calls ‘identification,’ and it is this evolving identification with the reader that makes the Origin such a powerful rhetorical argument” (268). Burke’s theories of consubstantiality are of particular interest to me based on my personal course outcomes to explore major theorists and conversations surrounding rhetoric of identity.


Works Cited

Miller, C. R. “A humanistic rationale for technical writing.” College English, vol. 40, no. 6, 1979, pp. 610-617.

PAB #4 (Methods & Methodology)

Teten, Ryan Lee. “‘We the People’: The ‘Modern’ Rhetorical Popular Address of the Presidents during the Founding Period.” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 60, no. 4, Dec. 2007, pp. 669-682. Ebscohost, doi: 10.1177/1065912907304495. Accessed 27 Oct. 2016.

Teten, a rhetorical scholar of political communication, uses rhetorical analysis to do historical inquiry within the field of political science to look at “the ‘traditional/modern’” paradigm as it relates to the speech category of the State of the Union address. For the scope souaof this research, he defines rhetorical leadership “as the process of discovering, articulating, and sharing the available means of influence in order to motivate human agents in a particular situation…it is leadership exerted through talk or persuasion” (Dorsey as qtd. on 670). His method is a “line-by-line content analysis through all of the State of the Union Addresses from George Washington to George W. Bush to count elements such as word length, specific word usage, and context” (671). These categories are designed to highlight both audience in address to congress vs. the people and speaker in identification, authority, and directive rhetoric. Teten concludes “that presidential rhetoric may not be easily categorized as simply ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’” (670, 671).

A closer look at each of the above listed categories reveals claims through each set of graphed data. For example, “contemporary presidents use identification rhetoric [we, us, our] in amounts never before seen in the State of the Union Address” (675). Authority rhetoric (I, me, my) is slightly more prevalent on the modern side of the paradigm, but there are traces of it more consistently throughout presidential history. Directive rhetoric (you, your, yours) is prevalent in our founding fathers’ speeches: “the initial presidents spoke with high levels of directive rhetoric to the people and the Congress…[which] mirrors the directive rhetoric of late-twentieth-century State of the Union Addresses” (678, 679).

Because of the method that Teten use, his study holds value in that each of his data sets holds a plethora of questions for further study. His multidisciplinary methodological approach allows for shared data and terms that can bring much to conversations in both Political Science and English Studies. Teten reiterates communication scholar David ffZarefsky’s conclusion that “‘it is worth re-examining earlier presidencies–not only to appreciate them more and see from whence we came–but to realize striking similarities and recurrent patterns of rhetorical innovation’” (qtd. on 680). The methodology of historical inquiry allows rhetorical analysis to highlight both the importance of the language used as well as the historical figures and to integrate multiple disciplines successfully. In light of our current political season, this analysis was interesting. I wonder what an analysis of Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s stump speeches and debates would reveal in using Teten’s same lens of identification, authority, and directive rhetoric. Would they align with our founding fathers in any ways or further the traditional/modern divide?

I had a hard time finding articles for this week’s topic of methods and methodologies. Rhetoric is a discipline that permeates so many others and its methodologies are fairly vast, at least in their application. I was able to find a small passage in one of our course textbooks that listed out historical inquiry, theory building, empirical research, discourse analysis, and postmodern investigation as a starting point for identifying and categorizing the array of research that rhetoricians do and rhetorical methods employed by other disciplines (Lauer 132). Ultimately, I had to use a couple articles that would highlight a methodology indirectly and connect to identification is some way.


Works Cited

Lauer, Janice M. “Rhetoric and Composition.” English Studies: An Introduction to the Discipline(s), edited by Bruce McComiskey, National Council for Teachers of English,  2006, 106-152.

Rhetoric of Identity: Epistemological Alignment

I suppose the guiding questions for this paper would firstly prompt a confession of my true identityintentions behind my research interests in rhetoric of identity: I am largely still trying to figure out my own identity. I don’t entirely know what I want to be when I grow up and there are many layers within my thirty-one years of life that have played a part in who I am as a scholar and truth-seeker, an educator, a student, a wife, a friend, a daughter, etc. Behind each aspect of my identity lies questions of how that construction came to be.

What rhetorical elements were and are still at play in my own identity formation and what role do I play in the identity constructions, both actively and passively, of my students and those whom I interact with consistently? What role does society play on my identity and the identities of my students?

 

As we have firmly established already this semester, English is a multidisciplinary field. If we can not agree on any other definition, that fact is evident. This fact is precisely what led me to English and has continued to lure me back into the English classroom, both as student and teacher. Rhetoric is of particular interest to me because it seems to be the intersection of so many aspects of each subdiscipline. The texts of study and contexts of consideration of each subfield require attention to unique rhetorical situations, and the resulting identities are fascinating to me. Language, society and culture, power structures, ideologies–all of these converge through rhetoric and impact identity construction in multifarious ways. How are we ultimately defined by the ideologies embedded within each of the above listed aspects? And how are these ideologies translated to us as members of a myriad of communities at any given stage of our lives? It is for all of these reasons that I have narrowed my research energy this semester to rhetoric of identity.

Althusser: Subjectivity and Ideology

In considering my own epistemological alignment, I find myself returning to Kenneth Burke’s term consubstantiality. Burke uses this term to describe someone who is both joined with and separate from another person or group. In our postmodern society, this seems to be how most people prefer to think of themselves in relation to any discourse community; we want to be part of a community but also maintain some level of independence and individuality. I also find myself more readily drawn to discussions of subjectivity, as Louis Althusser uses the term  when describing the identity construct one assumes within an ideological framework. We are capable, to some extent, of role-playing or assuming some level of expected identity portrayal when functioning within an ideological framework, but are we also able to resist the identity constructions being placed upon us?

From my own personal experience as both a student and a teacher within religious school settings, the overlapping ideologies of religion and education demand a certain identity. When applying a Burkean lens to one K-12 school’s vision statement, these two ideologies converge into a specific identity construct that is expected of students: “to become godly warriors.” Rhetoric helps to maintain the constant tension between the two ideologies and enables the subjectivity of each student and faculty member who is consubstantial with the institution.

In looking through sources for this paper, I discovered quite a spectrum in relation to this conversation of rhetoric of identity. From Freud to Burke to Butler, the topic dips into multidisciplinarity quickly. Burke, a follower of Freud in many regards, believed that “the most fundamental human desire is social rather than sexual” as Freud often claimed (124). Another point of divergent thought in Burke and Freud is in Burke’s insistence that “there is no essential identity” (Davis 127). The identifying “I” becomes essentially an actor assuming the mores of a group as a means of identification. The underlying premise here is that there is “an ‘individual’ who is individuated by nature itself”; this estrangement between self and other Burke explains as biological (128). Overcoming this biological estrangement becomes the rhetorical job of identification.

This of course relates to the Hegelian concept of the Other as well as Judith Butler’s inclusion of otherness in queer theory. Karen Kopelson, utilizing Butler’s theories, seems to be on the other end of the spectrum from either Freud or Burke: no intrinsic identity or self. Freud, claiming there is an intrinsic sexual self, forms one end of the spectrum; Burke, believing in an estranged biological self that is influenced socially, plots another point, perhaps near the middle of the spectrum, while Butler and Kopelson are on the other end of this identity spectrum: identity is performative.

This provides quite the array to consider when seeking my own epistemological alignment. Because my learning outcomes are often connected, at least partially, to my own identity as an educator, my Objects of Study are often students themselves and connecting artifacts, such as school handbooks and vision and mission statements. The pedagogical basis of Kopelson’s argument caught my attention for that reason. However, I was left questioning the ethical implications of a queer pedagogical approach that has “the express intention of disrupting students’ identity-based expectations” or that attempts to keep “them [students] ‘off balance’ by deliberately shifting among and between positions of provocative skepticism and fervent belief” (20, 25). As one instructor within Kopelson’s example stated, some students need an essentialist identity for a time of transition into a more unstable mindset. Are teenagers cognitively and emotionally able to deal with this level of instability?  

These residual questions imply that I do not align in all regards with queer theory approaches. I do, however, believe that Burke was onto something with his discussion of identity being largely molded by society and Althusser’s notions of ideological implications in identity construction. Butler also speaks to gender being a social construct, so in that regard I do agree with her theories. I believe that I align somewhere within this Marxist camp in its emphasis of power structures and ideological influence, although I obviously do not subscribe to all Marxist tenets.

Ultimately, I am fascinated in language’s power, no matter the theoretical lens, to impact identity construction in ways of which an individual is not even aware. I hope to find a niche in researching student identity constructs as one of my primary objects of study. Perhaps, through my research process, I will start to understand my own identity…here’s to hoping!

who-am-i


Works Cited

Althusser, Louis. “From Ideology and State Apparatuses.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 1335-1360.

Burke, Kenneth. “From A Rhetoric of Motives.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001, 1324-1340.

Davis, Diane. “Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2, 2008, pp. 123-147, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02773940701779785. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

Kopelson, Karen. “Dis/Integrating the Gay/Queer Binary: ‘Reconstructed Identity Politics’ for a Performative Pedagogy.” College English, vol. 65, no. 1, pp.17-35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3250728. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

 

PAB #3 (Epistemological Alignment)

Kopelson, Karen. “Dis/Integrating the Gay/Queer Binary: ‘Reconstructed Identity Politics’ for a Performative Pedagogy.” College English, vol. 65, no. 1, pp.17-35, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3250728. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

Examples of Identity Spectrums that many Identity-Based Pedagogical Approaches Promote

Kopelson, building upon Butler’s theory of performativity, argues for a deconstruction of identity-based politics. Much as Butler has stated, Kopelson reiterates that the coming-out narrative further perpetuates the binary construct of heterosexuality as the norm and homosexuality as the other. Identity-based pedagogical approaches, no matter how well-intentioned, run the risk of doing the same: creating a binary structure and encouraging that mindset within students. The both/and negotiated approaches of many English Studies Departments and composition classrooms can either centralize homophobic attitudes, perpetuate an atmosphere of fear, or reduce “‘the problem of remedying homophobia’” (20). Queer theory in general confuses, destabilizes, and challenges existing concepts of gender and sexuality. In fact, Kopelson goes so far as to claim the term queer as a verb because of the above mentioned synonymous actions that accompany a truly queer approach that results in a denormalizing of identity categories.

Ultimately, “any aspect of identity, or any intersection of aspects of identity, can be ‘queered’” (25). Kopelson gives an example of an instructor who queers the concept of whiteness and another who queers the identity of being a Jew. However, there is always a risk in association. Another example the author brings up is that of a Catholic, black lesbian. She is most commonly associated with black females and her sexuality and religion identity constructs become invisible because of this association. Perhaps the biggest issue Kopelson raises in conjunction with identity-based politics is the false presence of unity. As outliers, all marginalized people come to be viewed in unison. Ultimately, this eliminates the possibilities for difference.

Queer pedagogy that is performative-focused allows for “multiplicity… [which is] one of the greatest advantages of queer or performative pedagogies over pedagogies of disclosure/coming out” (25). While many who oppose queer pedagogical approaches fear that these will ironically replicate the invisibility of students who are already struggling for recognition, Kopelson sees this dynamic shift to embrace queer “politics where identity is a persistent and provocative question, but never a certainty” as a viable option to avoid both/and approaches or replicas of binary constructs (32). While she admits the possibility for failure, she ends with a admonition to embrace a pedagogy of no sides where there is a chance for success.

I found Kopelson’s multidisciplinary argument fascinating, especially following the identity theories of Burke and Freud who both argue for some ratio of essential identity, whether it’s social or sexual. Kopelson, utilizing Butler’s theories, seems to be on the other end of the spectrum: no intrinsic identity or self. This provides quite the array to consider when seeking my own epistemological alignment. Because my learning outcomes are often connected, at least partially, to my own identity as an educator, the pedagogical basis of Kopelson’s argument was interesting. I was left questioning the ethical implications of a queer pedagogical approach that has “the express intention of disrupting students’ identity-based expectations” or that attempts to keep “them [students] ‘off balance’ by deliberately shifting among and between positions of provocative skepticism and fervent belief” (20, 25). As one instructor within Kopelson’s example stated, some students need an essentialist identity for a time of transition into a more unstable  mindset. This call for dynamic pedagogy gives me reason to pause and consider all my students. Are teenagers cognitively and emotionally able to deal with this level of instability?  Perhaps explicitly queer pedagogical approaches should be reserved for the collegiate classroom.

PAB #3 (Epistemological Alignment)

Davis, Diane. “Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2, 2008, pp. 123-147, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02773940701779785. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

Davis highlights some distinctions between Burke’s theories of identity, largely centered upon symbolic acts that result in consubstantiality, and Freud’s psychoanalytic connections of the narcissist self and the other. Burke was heavily influenced by Freud, yet does move decisively away from Freudian notions at a couple points. These points of divergence largely center on Burke’s insistence that “Identification is compensatory to division” (123). Furthermore, Burke believes that “the most fundamental human desire is social rather than sexual,” as Freud often claimed (124).

Burke, the father of modern rhetoric, was well-versed in Aristotelian foundations of rhetoric being primarily an act of persuasion. Burke took that foundation and went further, claiming “that any persuasive act is first of all an identifying act” (125). This is where his term consubstantial is introduced, for one is both joined with and separate from another in most instances of identification. It is important to Burke that complete unity is not established as this unity would negate the need for any rhetorical/symbolic act. The ability to resist complete unity comes through human capability for critique and logic and rests in “the productive tension between fusion and division” (126).

Where one can find a point of divergent thought in Burke and Freud is in Burke’s insistence that “there is no essential identity” (127). The identifying “I” becomes essentially an actor assuming the mores of a group as a means of identification. The underlying premise here is that there is “an ‘individual’ who is individuated by nature itself”; this estrangement between self and other Burke explains as biological (128). Overcoming this biological estrangement becomes the rhetorical job of identification.

Davis briefly turns to the neuroscience behind much of these theories; mirror neurons in the brain actually do not make a distinction when I pick up a pencil or when I see someone else pick up a pencil. The same neurons fire. This unravels some of Burke’s presumptions. Another point of Burkean divergence rests upon Freud’s argument that identity constructs, perhaps better qualified as dis-identifications as they are identity constructs formed through disassociations, formed in the oral stage largely stick. Yet, one can see Burke and Freud converging once again in Freud’s second stage, that is largely social in nature, and in their theoretical bases on an ontological self with desires:

“So although Burke challenges psychoanalytical criticism for reducing the desire for social intercourse to a sexual desire, he is very much with the ‘official’ Freud in his refusal to question the ontological priority of desire itself, which, despite it all, presumes a subject who has desires, be they conscious or unconscious” (130).

 

Freud introduced Hypnosis and claimed that suggestion was magically powerful usage of language

Through an explanation of hypnosis and the power of language used throughout the  hypnotic process, Davis highlights the fact that Burke only briefly and without true explanation deals with the “rhetoric of hysteria.” This points to yet another point of divergence, albeit minor, in that Freud champions the “magic” of language’s power through suggestion, the rhetorical process of hypnotizing someone, which becomes a “fundamental problem” for rhetorical theory (142). Burke maintains “an almost absolute faith in the power of reason” in spite of one’s capacity for hysteria or ability to be manipulated through the power of suggestion. Davis concludes that, ultimately, “the[ir] disagreement is in the details” (125).

This article fits the context of our course outcomes in that it highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the field. Burke’s rhetorical theories are largely rooted in the field of psychology with their overt nod to Freud. Throughout Davis’s discussion, she references Heidegger, Lacan, and Butler, pointing to the interconnectivity of not only our field but theories within the field. This article also gives me some context for my own learning goals of re-familiarizing myself with rhetoric of identity and the key players and terms within that conversation.

PAB Entry #2 (Major Questions)

Jarratt, Susan C., and Nedra Reynolds. “The Splitting Image: Contemporary Feminisms and the Ethics of ethos.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 37-63.

     In moving away from a traditional Aristotelian sense of ethos, Jarratt and Reynolds marry sophist rhetoric and feminist theory to define ethos in a manner that recognizes difference and therefore makes a space for gender theory. Neither deconstruction nor Enlightenment era notions of the self work for feminist ethos; deconstructionism destabilizes the self in such a way that also destabilizes feminism. The Enlightenment era clings to Aristotelian notions of the self that don’t allow for difference. However, from Isocrates to Protagoras and Gorgias, sofaistrythese sophists connect character formation to adjusting community standards. This, basically the work of ideology, creates a space for an alliance between sophistic rhetoric and feminism (47).

     Utilizing a multidisciplinary approach that relies on feminism, rhetoric, and poststructuralism, the authors are able to “reread classical ethos through feminist history” (40). While older definitions of ethos point to customs or habits, newer notions point to character. Neither of these totally serve the purposes of feminist rhetorical goals. A rereading highlights character development through custom and habit (44). By tracing etymological definitions for key terms such as as ethea and nomos, the authors are able to locate a connection to the newer term of positionality, coined within this context by Linda Alcoff. It is precisely this “‘place from which values are interpreted and constructed rather than as a locus of an already determined set of values’” that allows a rereading of the classical notion of ethos that will acknowledge difference and therefore give voice to feminism (50). Experience and difference become integral to an understanding of the feminist rhetor.

     The authors champion a feminist standpoint theory that would celebrate difference to the point that any marginalized person can benefit from this redefined notion of ethos, which requires listeners to identify with the speaker. This inverts Aristotle’s traditional concept of ethos in which the speaker attempts to persuade an audience by highlighting similarities. Donna Haraway cinches the redefined ethos in her epistemological turn to the multiplicity of the speaker, which would allow for splitting instead of being. After all, “subjectivity is multidimensional…always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another” (55).

     Jarratt and Reynolds conclude with a brief application to the classroom. This reread ethos has pedagogical implications in that it can move student writing past the general audience and “Everyman” voice that students are accustomed to and comfortable with. With a framing of difference and multiplicity, teachers can encourage student writers to “split and resuture textual selves” through their writing (57). To me, this is dangerous territory as student identity constructs are largely unstable to begin with. There are ethical considerations for all theories we expose them to and encourage them to explore. Is it then unethical to potentially shake their identities in such a way? Or do we as instructors have a moral obligation to expose them to a myriad of identity theories as they are seeking their writing voice? This might be where a landscape for rhetoric of identity analysis.

PAB Entry #2 (Major Questions)

Alcorn, Marshall W. Jr. “Self-Structure as a Rhetorical Device: Modern Ethos and the   Divisiveness of the Self.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 3-35.

Alcorn argues for a reconception of ethos in both building upon and moving away from traditional (Aristotelian) definitions of ethos and poststructuralist (Rorty) definitions of the self. He argues for a definition of “ethos as a relationship existing between the discourse structures of selves and the discourse structures of ‘texts’” (6). The ancient Greek understanding of the self was conceptualized more as a character, defined and enacted by society. ethos_pathos_logosAristotle’s ethos implies that an audience, always passive, can be persuaded by the mere character of the speaker. Rorty goes further in defining the components of any self-structure as an evolution of four entities: character, person, self, and individual. It is not until the final stage, the individual, that one is free to select his or her identity construct. Alcorn agrees with the notion that “history shapes selves,” but the self is not passively shaped as it “can dialectically engage and resist…social interaction (12, 14). His main claim is that the self is ultimately a rhetorical entity as the two act upon one another: “The self is stable enough to resist change and changeable enough to admit to rhetorical manipulation but not so changeable as to constantly respond, chameleonlike, to each and every social force” (17). These changes require effective rhetoric with stylistic devices tailored to an audience well-researched.

The above theoretical considerations carry implications for a revision to the signified associated with the signifier ethos. While Alcorn isn’t claiming that either approach (Aristotelian or poststructuralist) is outdated, he is saying they are restrictive in light of the “prodigious diversity, plurality, and multiplicity” of our modern culture (18). These cultural characteristics have yielded a society full of divided, conflicted, and anxious selves. In utilizing a multidisciplinary approach, Alcorn taps into psychoanalysis through Freud’s ego freudmodeltheories. It is precisely these “inner voices” that a rhetor needs to tap into in order to rhetorically impact the self-structure. Alcorn also looks to sociological theories of leadership in the charismatic leader; it is the charismatic leader who is a “master of ethos” as he or she can communicate self (24). All of these discussions ultimately point to a modern ethos that is an “aesthetic manipulation of self-division” (28).

Literature and critical theory also reflect this modern concept of the divided self. In fact, Alcorn dedicates several pages to an analysis of Orwell’s essay “Shooting an Elephant” to highlight the potential available to an author (or speaker) with a modern ethos. Lastly, Alcorn discusses the pedagogical implications of such a revision to the concept of ethos. If teachers can facilitate class discussions so as to tap into the self-structures of our modern culture’s divided student identities, rhetoric can impact change to these learning selves.

Alcorn’s argument is in response to some of the basic research questions surrounding the topic of rhetoric of identity: How does rhetoric connect to and affect/impact identity? He personalizes this question to seek out a relationship between the self and language that leads him to a conclusion that the two (rhetoric and identity) are co-dependent: one yields the other and vice versa.

PAB Entry #1 (history paper)

Zarefsky, David. “Four Senses of Rhetorical History.” Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases. Ed. Kathleen J. Turner. University of Alabama Press, 1998. P. 19-32.

Zarefsky claims that “the heart of our problem is sloppiness in the professional discourse, and perhaps in the thought, of rhetorical historians” (19). He argues that the distinction between history and criticism does not matter.  Within this camp, history is concerned with “facts and chronicle” and criticism with “interpretation and judgment” (20). Together, this approach analyzes biographical information, public oration, and effectiveness through empirical measures (20), which is so broad that nearly anything can be made to fit.  A second distinction that doesn’t matter, according to Zarefsky, is between history and theory, mainly that history is noninterpretive. Ultimately, neither distinction addresses the “so what” question and therefore doesn’t matter.

 historiographyOn the other hand, distinctions that do matter point to four senses evolving from the term rhetorical history. First, the history of rhetoric is concerned with the development of effective discourse throughout the years and within various cultural contexts. This distinction, the least problematic of the four, connects in many ways with the history of ideas and is responsible for the reclamation of the sophist tradition among other important aspects of the rhetorical canon. Secondly, “‘the rhetoric of history is concerned with the tropes, arguments, and other devices of language used to write history and to persuade audiences'” (Megillah and McCloskey qtd. on 28). This distinction has ideological implications as scholars argue both about and from history.  The third and fourth senses are derived from what used to be known as the history of public address. The third sense, having undergone the most change, is the historical study of rhetorical events, which can be approached from a few angles: rhetorical discourse as a force in history or as an index or mirror of history; a focus on key arguments and terms; and discourse patterns that suggest a rhetorical trajectory (29). Finally and most elusively, the study of historical events from a rhetorical perspective “begins with the assumption that the rhetorical historical has the same subject matter as any other historian: ‘human life in all its totality and multiplicity'” (30). The only difference then rests on perspective, with the rhetorical historian focused on the perspective of discourse used persuasively.

The common thread throughout not only Zarefsky’s argument but many from within English studies is that our field is multidisciplinary. In fact, it is because the nature of our field is such that we rhetoricians should do history. Zarefsky highlights, with each of his four senses of rhetorical history, key research questions that point to methodologies and modes of inquiry relevant to each distinction. My personal research agenda requires that I ask where rhetoric of identity specifically fits. Within which sense, if any, does its history lie? I think the fourth sense, the study of historical events from a rhetorical perspective, would provide a space for historical inquiry with the specific agenda of locating rhetoric of identity. Perhaps, however, identification rhetoric dwells within the scope of any or all four senses.