PAB #3 (Epistemological Alignment)

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Davis, Diane. “Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2, 2008, pp. 123-147, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02773940701779785. Accessed 12 Oct. 2016.

Davis highlights some distinctions between Burke’s theories of identity, largely centered upon symbolic acts that result in consubstantiality, and Freud’s psychoanalytic connections of the narcissist self and the other. Burke was heavily influenced by Freud, yet does move decisively away from Freudian notions at a couple points. These points of divergence largely center on Burke’s insistence that “Identification is compensatory to division” (123). Furthermore, Burke believes that “the most fundamental human desire is social rather than sexual,” as Freud often claimed (124).

Burke, the father of modern rhetoric, was well-versed in Aristotelian foundations of rhetoric being primarily an act of persuasion. Burke took that foundation and went further, claiming “that any persuasive act is first of all an identifying act” (125). This is where his term consubstantial is introduced, for one is both joined with and separate from another in most instances of identification. It is important to Burke that complete unity is not established as this unity would negate the need for any rhetorical/symbolic act. The ability to resist complete unity comes through human capability for critique and logic and rests in “the productive tension between fusion and division” (126).

Where one can find a point of divergent thought in Burke and Freud is in Burke’s insistence that “there is no essential identity” (127). The identifying “I” becomes essentially an actor assuming the mores of a group as a means of identification. The underlying premise here is that there is “an ‘individual’ who is individuated by nature itself”; this estrangement between self and other Burke explains as biological (128). Overcoming this biological estrangement becomes the rhetorical job of identification.

Davis briefly turns to the neuroscience behind much of these theories; mirror neurons in the brain actually do not make a distinction when I pick up a pencil or when I see someone else pick up a pencil. The same neurons fire. This unravels some of Burke’s presumptions. Another point of Burkean divergence rests upon Freud’s argument that identity constructs, perhaps better qualified as dis-identifications as they are identity constructs formed through disassociations, formed in the oral stage largely stick. Yet, one can see Burke and Freud converging once again in Freud’s second stage, that is largely social in nature, and in their theoretical bases on an ontological self with desires:

“So although Burke challenges psychoanalytical criticism for reducing the desire for social intercourse to a sexual desire, he is very much with the ‘official’ Freud in his refusal to question the ontological priority of desire itself, which, despite it all, presumes a subject who has desires, be they conscious or unconscious” (130).

 

Freud introduced Hypnosis and claimed that suggestion was magically powerful usage of language

Through an explanation of hypnosis and the power of language used throughout the  hypnotic process, Davis highlights the fact that Burke only briefly and without true explanation deals with the “rhetoric of hysteria.” This points to yet another point of divergence, albeit minor, in that Freud champions the “magic” of language’s power through suggestion, the rhetorical process of hypnotizing someone, which becomes a “fundamental problem” for rhetorical theory (142). Burke maintains “an almost absolute faith in the power of reason” in spite of one’s capacity for hysteria or ability to be manipulated through the power of suggestion. Davis concludes that, ultimately, “the[ir] disagreement is in the details” (125).

This article fits the context of our course outcomes in that it highlights the interdisciplinary nature of the field. Burke’s rhetorical theories are largely rooted in the field of psychology with their overt nod to Freud. Throughout Davis’s discussion, she references Heidegger, Lacan, and Butler, pointing to the interconnectivity of not only our field but theories within the field. This article also gives me some context for my own learning goals of re-familiarizing myself with rhetoric of identity and the key players and terms within that conversation.

Paper #2: Major Questions

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Aristotle’s Rhetorical Situation

        While the major questions utilized by rhetoricians of identity have largely branched out into various directions, the common foundation does harken back to the classical concept of the rhetorical situation. The rhetor and the audience are the dominant points of connectivity when it comes to analyzing identity portrayal and perceptions. These two focal points highlight two of the major questions:

  1. What are the rhetor’s intentions and how does he/she want to be perceived?
  2. How much of the rhetor’s identity is determined by the audience? (Depew).

Each of these inquiries yields a series of sub-questions.

        When analyzing a rhetor’s intentions and identity portrayal, Aristotelian questions arise: what rhetorical tools are available to the rhetor and to what extent is he/she using those tools to persuade an audience? What challenges does the rhetor face in establishing the identity construct necessary to successfully persuade an audience (Depew)? For example, a white, young female teacher may have a difficult time in teaching a largely black/minority high school class because these audience members might associate with a certain people group. Take the nonfiction story of Freedom Writers. Erin Gruwell, the highlighted teacher, struggles to gain the trust of her “audience,” in this case a classroom full of students, because she does not look like them and is in an authority position of which they have come to be leery. Her rhetorical tools revolve around reaching into her students’ culture and pulling out artifacts to which they can relate and from which they can learn through familiar out-of-school literacies. freedomwritersstillcap2

        Sub-questions surrounding the analysis of the audiences’ perceptions of any given rhetor involve an audience’s awareness of social context. Does the audience see the rhetor’s identity as enacted through the social context? Does the audience see the rhetor’s identity as monolithic or fragmented, meaning reliant upon the rhetorical situation at hand (Depew)? This second question can also be inverted and applied back to the rhetor as well.

        These issues stemming from the rhetorical situation also point to questions of terminology. One term used in these conversations is consubstantiality, popularized by Kenneth Burke through his rhetorical theories of identity. Burke uses this term to describe someone who is both joined with and separate from another person or group. Louis Althusser uses subjectivity when describing the identity construct one assumes within an ideological framework. These more recent terms were preceded by Aristotle’s concept of ethos, which has probably changed and evolved the most over the past 2,000+ years. While Aristotle originally used the term as a site of persuasion, scholars and theorists have tailored the definition to modern culture and individual research projects. Susan C. Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds, for example, trace various uses of the term ethos etymologically. They “reread classical ethos through feminist history,” which reveals that while older definitions of ethos point to customs or habits, newer notions point to character (40). Ultimately, their rereading allows for a classical notion of ethos that will acknowledge difference and therefore give voice to feminism (50). Experience and difference become integral to an understanding of the feminist rhetor.

        With a slightly different angle on the term ethos, Marshall W. Alcorn Jr. argues for a definition of “ethos as a relationship existing between the discourse structures of selves and the discourse structures of ‘texts’” (6). Aristotle’s ethos implies that an audience, always passive, can be persuaded by the mere character of the speaker. His primary claim is that the self is ultimately a rhetorical entity as the two act upon one another: “The self is stable enough to resist change and changeable enough to admit to rhetorical manipulation but not so changeable as to constantly respond, chameleonlike, to each and every social force” (17). These changes require effective rhetoric with stylistic devices tailored to an audience well-researched. Alcorn deals with not only the question of terms and definitions, but also with the sub-question relating to rhetor’s identity as reliant upon social and rhetorical context and fragmented rather than monolithic.

        Feminist scholars and queer theorists have also recently taken up the conversation and given the research questions related to rhetorical identity constructs a gender focus. Judith Butler, for example, asks how identity is ultimately established through performative acts. Jacques Lacan questions society’s role in identity construction. Ultimately, while major

Barthes’ “The Death of the Author”

questions connected to identity constructs do still point to the foundational rhetorical situation, there has been a significant postmodern shift away from the rhetor’s intention and intended identity portrayal. Roland Barthes, for example, in “The Death of the Author” puts all the interpretive power in the hands of the audience. These might be the most significant historical shifts in major questions from Aristotle to current theorists: agency now lies with the audience and society.

My personal learning outcomes are always connected in part to how I can apply theory to my own pedagogy to improve practice in my classroom. Jarratt and Reynolds’ reread ethos has pedagogical implications in that it can move student writing past the general audience and “Everyman” voice that students are accustomed to and comfortable with. With a framing of difference and multiplicity, teachers can encourage student writers to “split and resuture textual selves” through their writing (57). To me, this is dangerous territory as student identity constructs are largely unstable to begin with. There are ethical considerations for all theories we expose students to and encourage them to explore. Is it then unethical to potentially shake their identities in such a way? Or do we as instructors have an ethical obligation to expose them to a myriad of identity theories as they are seeking their writing voice? This might be a landscape for rhetorical analysis of identity.

Works Cited

Alcorn, Marshall W. Jr. “Self-Structure as a Rhetorical Device: Modern Ethos and the   Divisiveness of the Self.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 3-35.

Althusser, Louis. “From Ideology and State Apparatuses.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 1335-1360.

Barthes, Roland. “The Death of the Author.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 1322-1326.

Burke, Kenneth. “From A Rhetoric of Motives.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001, 1324-1340.

Butler, Judith. “From Gender Trouble.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 2540-2552.

Depew, Kevin. Personal interview. 5 October 2016.

Jarratt, Susan C., and Nedra Reynolds. “The Splitting Image: Contemporary Feminisms and the Ethics of ethos.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 37-63.

Lacan, Jacques. “From The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 1169-1180.

PAB Entry #2 (Major Questions)

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Jarratt, Susan C., and Nedra Reynolds. “The Splitting Image: Contemporary Feminisms and the Ethics of ethos.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 37-63.

     In moving away from a traditional Aristotelian sense of ethos, Jarratt and Reynolds marry sophist rhetoric and feminist theory to define ethos in a manner that recognizes difference and therefore makes a space for gender theory. Neither deconstruction nor Enlightenment era notions of the self work for feminist ethos; deconstructionism destabilizes the self in such a way that also destabilizes feminism. The Enlightenment era clings to Aristotelian notions of the self that don’t allow for difference. However, from Isocrates to Protagoras and Gorgias, sofaistrythese sophists connect character formation to adjusting community standards. This, basically the work of ideology, creates a space for an alliance between sophistic rhetoric and feminism (47).

     Utilizing a multidisciplinary approach that relies on feminism, rhetoric, and poststructuralism, the authors are able to “reread classical ethos through feminist history” (40). While older definitions of ethos point to customs or habits, newer notions point to character. Neither of these totally serve the purposes of feminist rhetorical goals. A rereading highlights character development through custom and habit (44). By tracing etymological definitions for key terms such as as ethea and nomos, the authors are able to locate a connection to the newer term of positionality, coined within this context by Linda Alcoff. It is precisely this “‘place from which values are interpreted and constructed rather than as a locus of an already determined set of values’” that allows a rereading of the classical notion of ethos that will acknowledge difference and therefore give voice to feminism (50). Experience and difference become integral to an understanding of the feminist rhetor.

     The authors champion a feminist standpoint theory that would celebrate difference to the point that any marginalized person can benefit from this redefined notion of ethos, which requires listeners to identify with the speaker. This inverts Aristotle’s traditional concept of ethos in which the speaker attempts to persuade an audience by highlighting similarities. Donna Haraway cinches the redefined ethos in her epistemological turn to the multiplicity of the speaker, which would allow for splitting instead of being. After all, “subjectivity is multidimensional…always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be another” (55).

     Jarratt and Reynolds conclude with a brief application to the classroom. This reread ethos has pedagogical implications in that it can move student writing past the general audience and “Everyman” voice that students are accustomed to and comfortable with. With a framing of difference and multiplicity, teachers can encourage student writers to “split and resuture textual selves” through their writing (57). To me, this is dangerous territory as student identity constructs are largely unstable to begin with. There are ethical considerations for all theories we expose them to and encourage them to explore. Is it then unethical to potentially shake their identities in such a way? Or do we as instructors have a moral obligation to expose them to a myriad of identity theories as they are seeking their writing voice? This might be where a landscape for rhetoric of identity analysis.

PAB Entry #2 (Major Questions)

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Alcorn, Marshall W. Jr. “Self-Structure as a Rhetorical Device: Modern Ethos and the   Divisiveness of the Self.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1995, 3-35.

Alcorn argues for a reconception of ethos in both building upon and moving away from traditional (Aristotelian) definitions of ethos and poststructuralist (Rorty) definitions of the self. He argues for a definition of “ethos as a relationship existing between the discourse structures of selves and the discourse structures of ‘texts’” (6). The ancient Greek understanding of the self was conceptualized more as a character, defined and enacted by society. ethos_pathos_logosAristotle’s ethos implies that an audience, always passive, can be persuaded by the mere character of the speaker. Rorty goes further in defining the components of any self-structure as an evolution of four entities: character, person, self, and individual. It is not until the final stage, the individual, that one is free to select his or her identity construct. Alcorn agrees with the notion that “history shapes selves,” but the self is not passively shaped as it “can dialectically engage and resist…social interaction (12, 14). His main claim is that the self is ultimately a rhetorical entity as the two act upon one another: “The self is stable enough to resist change and changeable enough to admit to rhetorical manipulation but not so changeable as to constantly respond, chameleonlike, to each and every social force” (17). These changes require effective rhetoric with stylistic devices tailored to an audience well-researched.

The above theoretical considerations carry implications for a revision to the signified associated with the signifier ethos. While Alcorn isn’t claiming that either approach (Aristotelian or poststructuralist) is outdated, he is saying they are restrictive in light of the “prodigious diversity, plurality, and multiplicity” of our modern culture (18). These cultural characteristics have yielded a society full of divided, conflicted, and anxious selves. In utilizing a multidisciplinary approach, Alcorn taps into psychoanalysis through Freud’s ego freudmodeltheories. It is precisely these “inner voices” that a rhetor needs to tap into in order to rhetorically impact the self-structure. Alcorn also looks to sociological theories of leadership in the charismatic leader; it is the charismatic leader who is a “master of ethos” as he or she can communicate self (24). All of these discussions ultimately point to a modern ethos that is an “aesthetic manipulation of self-division” (28).

Literature and critical theory also reflect this modern concept of the divided self. In fact, Alcorn dedicates several pages to an analysis of Orwell’s essay “Shooting an Elephant” to highlight the potential available to an author (or speaker) with a modern ethos. Lastly, Alcorn discusses the pedagogical implications of such a revision to the concept of ethos. If teachers can facilitate class discussions so as to tap into the self-structures of our modern culture’s divided student identities, rhetoric can impact change to these learning selves.

Alcorn’s argument is in response to some of the basic research questions surrounding the topic of rhetoric of identity: How does rhetoric connect to and affect/impact identity? He personalizes this question to seek out a relationship between the self and language that leads him to a conclusion that the two (rhetoric and identity) are co-dependent: one yields the other and vice versa.

Paper #1: History

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A Historical Snapshot of Rhetoric of Identity: From Male-Dominated to Feminist-Focused

Trying to find a starting point for rhetorical discussion dedicated to identity has proven to be somewhat problematic as it is not actually a sub-discipline or a topic that scholars have solely dedicated their research to. Most embed or imply rhetoric of identity in larger studies and conversations. In fact, over time, schisms have arisen that assume a specific rhetorical identity stance through which to claim ethos and enter an ongoing conversation. Take feminist studies for example: Elaine Showalter, Barbara Smith, Judith Butler, and many more have established an identity construct that allows a rhetorical stance to be assumed and analysis to be done within the discourse community associated with that particular identity. Yet while the history is spotty and one must pull back layers, there is a rich history there.

      I would think it remiss if one did not include Quintilian and Cicero somewhere close to 05-01quintiliancicerobeginning of this movement. Of course the earliest moments of recorded rhetorical history are male-dominated, much like the traditional rhetorical canon. Many of these earliest rhetoricians dedicated their lives to education in the rhetorical tradition. Quintilian is one such rhetor. His infamous mantra of “A good man speaking well” is clear in its underlaid emphasis on the identity construct required of any good rhetorician (Bizzell and Herzberg 359-363). Cicero is another such rhetorician. He speaks to the importance of “integrity and supreme wisdom, and if we bestow fluency of speech on persons devoid of those virtues, we shall not have made orators of them, but shall have put weapons into the hands of madmen” (qtd. in Katz 255). The identity of the rhetorician was rarely divorced from the character of the speaker as the quality of skill was often associated with the integrity of a man.

      While this tradition lasted for quite some time, recently feminist scholars have challenged most if not all of the notions established by the males of our canon. Tita French Baulmin declares “a good woman speaking well” should also be granted a voice in this conversation of identity. With a specific research focus on the Renaissance era, not ironically known for the “Renaissance man” rather than woman, she claims that the phrase would be considered a contradiction. In calling on the rhetorical identity term ethos, she claims that “Ethos as the site of ideological battle will always show traces of capitulations to, and exploitations of, both authority and Other” (253). Using Elizabeth I, she argues that to identity her as an “honorary male” based on her rhetoric would be an eradication of identity.

      Baulmin’s conversation brings together two historically significant aspects to the rhetoric of identity conversation: the variants in terminology and the concept of the Other. Ethos, while most commonly associated with Aristotle’s appeals, can be ascribed to “personal or collective identity” (Zulick 20). Kenneth Burke, my personal point of interest in this historical burkeconversation, uses the term consubstantial to describe someone who is both joined with and separate from another person or group. This, he claims, is “the source of dedications and enslavements” (qtd. in Bizzell and Herzberg 1325). Hegel introduced the concept of the Other, in which one can only truly understand one’s self through interactions with and comparisons to another (541). This has been carried over into more current conversation of gender and sex in the fields of feminist and queer studies.

      For feminist scholars such as Cheryl Glenn, historiography cannot be accurately accomplished without the joint perspectives of gender studies and feminism, two sub-disciplines vital today to any rhetorical discussion of identity (288). Most relevant discussions will most likely adopt a multidisciplinary approach to identity, making rhetoric one of several angles. In fact, Zarefsky, in mapping out four senses of rhetorical history, also speaks to the multidisciplinary nature of most methodologies and modes of inquiry. My approach to this research on rhetoric of identity seems to best fit within his sense of the rhetoric of history because of the ideological implications of identity constructs (27-28).

      Most aspects to any identity are going to be largely constituted through language. From Quintilian to Burke to more recent contributions to the conversation, like Lacan (identity as being a social construct) and Butler (identity as a series of performative actions), the conversations of rhetoric of identity are still finding the right words through which to discuss this interdisciplinary topic. The university system as a whole employs rhetoric of identity continuously as faculty members, students, and sports fans alike make themselves consubstantial with the ideals of their chosen institution. Our current political season has encouraged attention once again to the topic of rhetoric of identity as citizens seek out a place in which to have a voice that is heard through a candidate to whom they might identity. In these ways, rhetoric of identity goes beyond the walls of any university.

Works Cited

Baulmin, Tita French. “‘A Good (Wo)Man Skilled in Speaking’: Ethos, Self-Fashioning, and   Gender in Renaissance England.” Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory, edited by James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Southern Methodist University Press, 1994, 229-263.

Bizzell, Patricia, and Bruce Herzberg. “Quintilian.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001, 359-364.

Burke, Kenneth. “From A Rhetoric of Motives.” The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present, edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001, 1324-1340.

Glenn, Cheryl. “Remapping Rhetorical Territory.” Rhetoric Review, vol. 13, no. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 287-303. JSTOR. Sept. 14, 2016.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. “From Phenomenology of Spirit.” The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Vincent B. Leitch, et al., W.W. Norton & Company, 2010, 541-547.

Katz, S. B. “The ethic of expediency: Classical rhetoric, technology, and the Holocaust.” College English, vol. 54, no. 3, 1992, pp.255-275. JSTOR. Oct. 4, 2008.

Zarefsky, David. “Four Senses of Rhetorical History.” Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases. Ed. Kathleen J. Turner. University of Alabama Press, 1998, 19-32.

Zulick, Margaret D. “The Ethos of Invention: The Dialogue of Ethics and Aesthetics in Kenneth Burke and Mikhail Bakhtin.” The Ethos of Rhetoric, edited by Michael J. Hyde, University of South Carolina Press, 2004, 20-33.

PAB Entry #1 (history paper)

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Zarefsky, David. “Four Senses of Rhetorical History.” Doing Rhetorical History: Concepts and Cases. Ed. Kathleen J. Turner. University of Alabama Press, 1998. P. 19-32.

Zarefsky claims that “the heart of our problem is sloppiness in the professional discourse, and perhaps in the thought, of rhetorical historians” (19). He argues that the distinction between history and criticism does not matter.  Within this camp, history is concerned with “facts and chronicle” and criticism with “interpretation and judgment” (20). Together, this approach analyzes biographical information, public oration, and effectiveness through empirical measures (20), which is so broad that nearly anything can be made to fit.  A second distinction that doesn’t matter, according to Zarefsky, is between history and theory, mainly that history is noninterpretive. Ultimately, neither distinction addresses the “so what” question and therefore doesn’t matter.

  historiographyOn the other hand, distinctions that do matter point to four senses evolving from the term rhetorical history. First, the history of rhetoric is concerned with the development of effective discourse throughout the years and within various cultural contexts. This distinction, the least problematic of the four, connects in many ways with the history of ideas and is responsible for the reclamation of the sophist tradition among other important aspects of the rhetorical canon. Secondly, “‘the rhetoric of history is concerned with the tropes, arguments, and other devices of language used to write history and to persuade audiences'” (Megillah and McCloskey qtd. on 28). This distinction has ideological implications as scholars argue both about and from history.  The third and fourth senses are derived from what used to be known as the history of public address. The third sense, having undergone the most change, is the historical study of rhetorical events, which can be approached from a few angles: rhetorical discourse as a force in history or as an index or mirror of history; a focus on key arguments and terms; and discourse patterns that suggest a rhetorical trajectory (29). Finally and most elusively, the study of historical events from a rhetorical perspective “begins with the assumption that the rhetorical historical has the same subject matter as any other historian: ‘human life in all its totality and multiplicity'” (30). The only difference then rests on perspective, with the rhetorical historian focused on the perspective of discourse used persuasively.

The common thread throughout not only Zarefsky’s argument but many from within English studies is that our field is multidisciplinary. In fact, it is because the nature of our field is such that we rhetoricians should do history. Zarefsky highlights, with each of his four senses of rhetorical history, key research questions that point to methodologies and modes of inquiry relevant to each distinction. My personal research agenda requires that I ask where rhetoric of identity specifically fits. Within which sense, if any, does its history lie? I think the fourth sense, the study of historical events from a rhetorical perspective, would provide a space for historical inquiry with the specific agenda of locating rhetoric of identity. Perhaps, however, identification rhetoric dwells within the scope of any or all four senses.

PAB Entry #1 (history paper)

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Glenn, Cheryl. “Remapping Rhetorical Territory.” Rhetoric Review, vol. 13, no. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 287-303. JSTOR. Sept. 14, 2016. 

Glenn calls for a remapping of the traditional, male-dominated rhetorical history and canon to include marginalized rhetors diverse in gender, race, and class. Using Bizzell’s suggested methodologies, Glenn covers three angles for mapping consideration: historiography, feminism, and gender studies (288). Historiography, etymologically defined as writing history, calls into question the biases of any interpretation relayed through historical narrative. Ultimately, the job of this methodology is to connect the real and discourse, which often creates a type of myth: “historiographic rhetorical maps never reflect a neutral reality…they subtly shape our perceptions of a rhetoric englobed” (291). In approaching historiography angularly rather than linearly, it allows one to “make the unfamiliar familiar and the familiar unfamiliar,” which can help avoid “‘female tokenism’” (292; 293). Feminism and feminist studies brings women rhetors who have been overlooked for decades, or centuries even, to light through revisionary histories. Aspasia, Glenn’s main female example, has been considered a  second class rhetor at best because all that is documented from her is from secondary sources. Socrates, on the other hand, is canonized even though his rhetorical work is also only documented in secondary sources. The only significant difference is sex. Glenn calls for doing more than “merely compensatory or additive histories of women rhetoricians…any remapping must locate female rhetorical accomplishments within the male-dominated and male-documented rhetorical tradition that it interrogates” (293-294). Lastly, gender studies reveals the power hierarchy inherent in the rhetorical canon, largely beginning with Aristotle. While feminist research and gender studies are similar in scope, they bring differences in inquiry and methodology to rhetorical historiography. Gender studies is more about the culturally-constructed performative acts whereas feminist studies largely relies on sex as means for distinction. This multidisciplinary approach to mapping our rhetorical history provides a means for professionalizing more members of our field through “shared historical experiences” and new “ways to connect our current rhetorical inquiries, histories, and mappings with our contemporary academic and social concerns” (300; 299).

Glenn’s multidisciplinary approach aligns with much of our course discussion and readings englishso far. For example, Nugent and Ostergaard’s distinction between preservation and transformation is a different aspect of the same conversation. The very nature of English studies is rooted in an ever-changing history with dynamic boundaries that span disciplines from communication and linguistics to the pragmatic sub-fields of composition and pedagogy. McComiskey talks directly about the topic of identification in calling for integration within the field of English studies. Miller discusses the four disciplinary corners that make up the ambiguous field of English studies. Glenn’s discussion falls right in line with these concepts. To point to a static history would be a mistake as undoubtedly, there are still aspects, or angles to borrow Glenn’s terminology, yet veiled to our current modes of inquiry and research methodologies as they are fluid and even undefined in some sub-fields.

While this article is dated (1995), I selected it because of the focus on the gap in rhetorical history, which points to my chosen topic of rhetoric of identity. Gender studies, queer theories, and feminist studies all overlap with rhetoric of identity in some way. I do intend to focus more on a traditional Burkean notion of rhetoric of identity for my primary point for my research throughout the semester (mainly because it is more beneficial to my end research goals), but I would be replicating the very problem addressed within Glenn’s article if I did not look to include the marginalized aspects of rhetorical history.